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Abstract. In deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must con-
sider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical
structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship
between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the num-
ber of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such
coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members’
ability levels. In any stable system each coalition is of an efficient size and every
agent is paid her marginal contribution. (JEL Codes: C71, D71)
Keywords: Stable systems, Abilities, Cyclic partition, Non-segregation.
1 Introduction
Circumstances abound in which individual agents interact via the organisations they
choose to belong to. This paper studies this type of situations and reports novel
findings on the competing teams/coalitions (e.g. firms, political parties or gangs)
that emerge endogenously, with an emphasis on how the structure and composition
of teams are interrelated with the level of vertical inequality within teams.
Understanding what determines the number and composition of coalitions or
teams has been a recurrent focus in many strands of literature (discussed below),
but, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic work exists on the relationship
between such horizontal segmentation incentives and the vertical structure within
each endogenous team. An investigation of the interplay of these two dimensions,
especially when the relevant agents are heterogeneous in their ability, can shed new
lights on a number of interesting questions: As ability differentials among agents
increase, should the number of rival teams increase or decrease, and should the
endogenous teams become more or less segregated? Are there general connections
between endogenous meritocracy and the degree of competition? This paper de-
velops a cooperative game theoretic framework to address such questions in an
institution-free environment, and provides some new insights.
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2A key assumption of the model is that the relevant agents have observable,
heterogeneous ability levels, and the total surplus of a team may depend both on
its size and on the aggregate ability of its members. Given a distribution of agents’
ability levels and a surplus function capturing technology available to teams, a
partition of agents into coalitions/teams with imputation rules constitute a stable
system if no profitable coalitional deviation is possible.
The main finding is that the forces of competition and selection lead to emergence
of non-segregated rival teams that compensate members their respective maximal
possible value to a team, which also implies a positive association between the num-
ber of rival teams formed and the internal inequality levels exhibited. Specifically,
we show that (1) in every stable system, each team is efficient, every agent con-
tributes her full potential to a team and is paid accordingly, and the rival teams are
non-segregated (under mild conditions); (2) the more unequally shared is the sur-
plus across ranks internally, i.e., the higher is the vertical inequality, the larger is the
number of rival teams to be formed in a stable partition of the relevant agents; (3) in
a heuristic class of environments in which teams are restricted to single-parameter
imputation rules, a system is stable if and only if the agents are partitioned into
cyclic teams (i.e., teams composed of equidistant agents in their ability ordering).
When teams compensate their members more unequally across their internal
ranks, agents are motivated more strongly to be in a team in which they are ranked
higher, either by moving to or forming another team. This insight underlies our
main result that the number of teams in a stable system is positively related to the
level of internal inequality they exhibit.
The finding that organisations tend to consist of members from widely dispersed
ability levels (despite one-dimensional heterogeneity) contrasts starkly with the seg-
regation outcomes that are prevalent in the literature on some other kinds of group
formation, such as the important literature on clubs and jurisdictions providing lo-
cal public goods. These studies (see e.g. Jehiel and Scotchmer, 2001, and references
therein) differ from ours in that different jurisdictions provide different local pub-
lic good quantities and internal division of surplus is not a key strategic variable.
Moreover, typically agents are not differentiated in terms of ability.
The literatures on social classes (Akerlof, 1997), partnerships (Farrell and Scotch-
mer, 1988), hedonic games (Banerjee et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002;
Le Breton et al., 2008; Watts, 2007),1 social status (Milchtaich and Winter, 2002),
and organisation (e.g., Demange 2004, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006, and an
1In hedonic games agents’ payoffs are determined by the composition of their own coalition
only. In our game the agents’ utility depends on an endogenously determined imputation rule in
the coalition, as well as on the aggregate strength of the coalition, so it is not a proper hedonic
game. Our model can be viewed as generalising Gamson games (see, e.g., Le Breton et al., 2008):
in this special class of hedonic games the total cake goes to the coalition that has more than half
of the total talent, whereas our analysis includes settings where coalitions fight over market shares
or power shares, with no magic value given to passing a 50% threshold.
3earlier work on firm formation by Legros and Newman, 1996), are all broadly re-
lated, but our approach is distinguished from these studies in the following respect:
vertically differentiated agents potentially face a dilemma between teaming up with
more able agents for a more powerful team and teaming up with less able agents
for a higher internal rank. Damiano et al. (2010) consider a similar tension but in
a setting where agents decide which one to join from a fixed set of coalitions, moti-
vated by contexts different from ours.2 Watts (2007), on the other hand, analyzes
two separate settings, one in which agents desire to team up with higher ability
members (under the “average quality payoff”), and an opposite one in which they
desire to team up with lower ability members (under the “big fish payoff”).
Piccione and Razin (2011) study coalition formation in partition function games,
in which an agent’s social ranking is determined lexicographically, first by the “power
relation” between the coalitions formed, then by her ability within the relevant
coalition. The core is empty in this setting if the size dictates the power relation of
coalitions. For this reason, they define a recursively stable solution concept, yielding
existence and characterisation results in the spirit of our non-segregation results. A
more recent paper, Barbera et al. (2014) show that meritocratic sharing norms in
some coalitions can coexist with egalitarian norms in others.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model; section 3
provides a complete characterisation of stable systems, and the main result on the
relationship between vertical inequality within teams and the number of endogenous
teams; section 4 illustrates the additional cyclicity result that obtains when teams
are restricted to single parameter imputation rules; section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider an economy with a population Ω = {1, 2, · · · , N} consisting of N(≤ ∞)
agents, indexed according to their observable, heterogeneous ability (which could be,
e.g., political ability, market ability, or criminal ability, depending on the applica-
tion), denoted by ai > 0 for agent i ∈ Ω, so that ai > ai+1 for all i. For expositional
clarity, in this note we assume a geometric distribution of abilities3:
ai = a
i−1 for all i ∈ Ω, where a ∈ (0, 1).
2In Damiano et al. (2010), agents of different abilities choose between two organisations of a
fixed capacity of measure 1, when the agent’s utility increases both in the average ability of the
organisation (peer effect) and in her internal ranking (pecking order effect). If the value of each
coalition is a function of the average ability of agents, they obtain some degree of segregation of
ability types, with a larger overlap when the pecking order effect is stronger. Their results apply
to very different contexts, such as students’ choices among a fixed set of universities, rather than
endogenous formation of organisations.
3The core results reported in this note extend to general distributions but the exposition is
more complicated - see Morelli and Park (2014) for details.
4Economic activity is assumed to take place through teams/coalitions where each
team is a group of agents who perform a variety of tasks needed for production.
We assume that there is a certain number M(≤ N) of essential and complementary
tasks, so that efficiency of a team Z ⊂ Ω improves in the number of its members,
called its size and denoted by |Z|, until it reaches M (as represented by the function
ζ below).4 Moreover, an agent’s ability reflects her relative productivity in a team,
so that the total surplus of a team of a given size increases linearly with the aggregate
ability of its members, called its power and denoted by p(Z), subject to a constraint
that for a team to operate its power must exceed a certain minimum level, denoted
by P ≥ 0.
Formally, the total surplus s(Z) of a team Z ⊂ Ω is
s(Z) := p(Z) · ζ(|Z|) (1)
where ζ : N→ (0, 1] is such that ζ(n− 1) < ζ(n) if n ≤M and ζ(n) = 1 if n ≥M ,
and
p(Z) =
{∑
i∈Z a
i−1 if
∑
i∈Z a
i−1 ≥ P
0 otherwise.
We say that a team Z is productive if p(Z) ≥ P and unproductive otherwise; and
that it is efficient if it is productive and |Z| ≥M , and inefficient otherwise.
The parameters P and M are meant to capture different technological and mar-
ket characteristics of various sectors at different stages of development. In the
extreme case of M = 1 and P = 0, there is no need to form a team because each
agent’s contribution is the same as a member of any team, as well as when standing
alone. In the opposite extreme case of M = N < ∞, it seems intuitive that the
grand coalition is likely to form as it is the unique efficient team. Below we focus on
more interesting situations in which team-forming is desirable and multiple efficient
teams may coexist in a system. In particular, we assume that
p(Ω \ {1}) ≥ P and M ≤ N − 1. (2)
An efficient team must include agent 1 if the first inequality fails, while it must
include everyone if the second fails5: both preclude multiple efficient teams.
A population Ω of agents, their ability levels depicted by a ∈ (0, 1), and the
surplus function s, specify an “environment” in which teams get formed endoge-
nously. Each endogenous team, Z ⊂ Ω, adopts an imputation rule, denoted by
f : Z → [0, 1], which specifies for each member i ∈ Z a fraction f(i) of the total
4Note that it is implicitly assumed that agents are more productive when they specialise in one
task rather than spreading their time across multiple tasks.
5Note that the second inequality holds if M = N = ∞, in which case all teams of infinite size
are efficient as is the case in the illustration of the next section.
5surplus s(Z) to be allocated to that member, with
∑
i∈Z f(i) = 1. Thus, the payoff
of agent i ∈ Z is
ui(Z, f) = f(i) · s(Z). (3)
A system is a pair (pi, ρ), where pi = {Z1, · · · , ZK} is a partition of Ω into teams,
and ρ is a function that maps each team Zk ∈ pi to an imputation rule of that team.
We adopt the convention that teams in a system are labelled according to the order
of ability of the most able member of each team, referred to as the “head” of the
team. That is, min{i|i ∈ Zk} < min{i|i ∈ Zk′} if k < k′.
A system (pi, ρ) is stable if there does not exist a deviationD ⊂ Ω that is profitable
relative to the system (pi, ρ) in the sense that
ui(D, f) ≥ ui(pi(i), ρ(pi(i))) ∀i ∈ D 6= ∅
for some imputation rule f that D may adopt, where pi(i) is the team Zk ∈ pi such
that i ∈ Zk, and the inequality is strict for some i ∈ D.
We are interested in understanding how the intra-team inequality in compen-
sation relates to the structure and composition of endogenously formed teams. To
facilitate exposition, we introduce the notion of the “rank” of members within a
team: the agent paid the most within a team is ranked first, and so on. Then,
an imputation rule of a team Z ⊂ Ω can be represented by a rank-imputation rule
which is a vector
f = (f1, f2, · · · , f|Z|) ∈ [0, 1]|Z|
where fr is the fraction of the surplus allocated to the member ranked r-th, together
with a “ranking rule” that assigns members of Z to ranks 1 through |Z|. Note that∑|Z|
r=1 fr = 1. We compare intra-team inequality by comparing the ratios of the
payoff each rank receives relative to the payoff received by the rank above, i.e.,
fr+1/fr for r = 1, 2, · · · .
3 Characterization of stable systems
Given an environment, define L as the least able agent such that the team consisting
of all agents from L to N is productive, that is,
L := max{n ∣∣ N∑
i=n
ai−1 ≥ P}.
Note that L ≥ 2 by (2). The set of stable systems is characterised as follows.
Proposition 1 A system is stable if and only if every team is efficient and every
agent’s payoff is equal to her ability.
6Proof. Consider a system where every team is efficient and every agent’s payoff is
equal to her ability. Then, no deviation may pay some of their members more than
their abilities without reducing other members’ payoffs below their abilities, because
the total surplus of any team is at most the sum of its members’ abilities by (1).
Hence, such a system is stable.
Next, we prove the converse. In a system (pi, ρ) where one team, say Z` ∈ pi,
is either unproductive or of a size less than M , the sum of the total surpluses of
all teams in the system is strictly lower than the surplus of the grand coalition,
p(Ω), because each team generates a surplus s(Zk) ≤
∑
i∈Zk a
i−1 by (1) where the
inequality is strict if p(Zk) < P or |Zk| < M . Thus, forming a grand coalition is a
beneficial deviation because there is an imputation rule, for example, that rewards
everyone in Z` more than and everyone else the same as in the system (pi, ρ). This
proves that every team in a stable system must be efficient.
Moreover, with a view to reaching a contradiction, suppose that an agent, say
i, receives a payoff less than her ability, ai−1, in a system where every team is
productive and of size M or larger. Then, it would be clearly beneficial for agent i
to join another team, say Zk, if it exists because she will increase the surplus of Zk
by ai−1 so that she can be paid more than before without reducing the payoff to any
of the original members of Zk. Consider the alternative case that there is no other
team, i.e., the system consists of the grand coalition. Let j denote an agent whose
payoff exceeds her ability in the system, who must exist because the total surplus of
the grand coalition is the sum of all agents’ ability while agent i is paid less than her
ability. Then, the deviation Ω \ {j} would be profitable because, compared to the
grand coalition, the total surplus is reduced by aj−1 (as it remains to be efficient by
(2)) while the total wage bill is reduced by more, so that an imputation rule exists
that improves the payoff of everyone in Ω \ {j}, strictly for some. This proves the
converse.
Thus, in a stable system every team must have an agent no less able than agent
L as its head in order to be productive, and must have an agent no more able than
agent M in order to be efficient. If L < M , therefore, any two teams are non-
segregated: at least one of the teams has an agent whose ability is in-between the
most and the least able members of the other team.
Corollary 1 If L < M , any two teams are non-segregated in every stable system.
Having now characterised the set of stable systems, we move on to address the
main question of the paper, namely, the relationship between vertical inequality
within teams and the number and composition of teams. Consider two systems in a
given environment, denoted by F = (piF , ρF ) and G = (piG, ρG). We say that F is less
equal than G if the fraction of each agent’s payoff relative to that of the agent one
rank above is uniformly lower in F than in G. Formally, let (fk1 , f
k
2 , · · · ) = ρF (Yk)
7be the rank-imputation rule of a team Yk ∈ piF , and let (g`1, g`2, · · · ) = ρG(Z`) be the
rank-imputation rule of a team Z` ∈ piG. Then, F is “less equal” than G if
max
{(k,r)|Yk∈piF ,1≤r≤|Yk|−1}
fkr+1
fkr
≤ min
{(`,r)|Z`∈piG,1≤r≤|Z`|−1}
g`r+1
g`r
, (4)
and strictly so if the inequality in (4) is strict.
Proposition 2 Consider two stable systems F = (piF , ρF ) and G = (piG, ρG) in
an environment where L < M . If F is (strictly) less equal than G, then F has a
(strictly) larger number of teams than G.
Proof. As each agent’s payoff is equal to her ability in any stable system by Proposi-
tion 1,
fkr+1
fkr
and
g`r+1
g`r
are of the form aν where ν ∈ N is the distance between the two
consecutively ranked agents in their ability ordering of Ω. Let aνF and aνG denote
the values on the LHS and RHS of (4). Then, the condition (4) implies that
(a) aνF ≤ aνG ⇔ νF ≥ νG,
(b) any two consecutively ranked agents in F are at least νF apart in their ability
ordering of Ω, and
(c) any two consecutively ranked agents in G are at most νG apart in their ability
ordering of Ω.
In addition, recall from Proposition 1 that every team in F or G
(d) must be productive, so its head is an agent in the set L = {1, 2, · · · , L}, and
(e) must be efficient, so contains an agent outside of L.
Let Y1 denote the team headed by agent 1 in F . Let j denote the second-ranked
agent in Y1. As j ≥ 1 + νF and no two agents between 2 and 1 + νF belong to the
same team by (b), there must be at least νF teams in F .
For the system G, let h denote the least able agent who heads a team in G, where
h ≤ L by (d). If h ≤ νG, it is clear that there may be at most νG teams in G. If
h > νG, consider the set of all agents between h−νG + 1 and h, {h−νG + 1, · · · , h}.
As any team headed by an agent more able than h − νG + 1 must have a member
in {h− νG + 1, · · · , h} by (c) and (e), it follows that every team in G has a member
in {h − νG + 1, · · · , h}. Consequently, the number of teams in G is at most the
cardinality of {h− νG + 1, · · · , h}, i.e., νG. The proposition follows from (a).
In the environments considered above, stable systems always exist, admit a com-
plete characterisation, and exhibit positive relationship between intra-team inequal-
ity and the number of teams in the system. Yet, it is difficult to envision the set of
all stable systems and their interrelations, because teams of a large variety of sizes
and imputation rules are viable in stable systems due to relatively general produc-
tion technology and flexible intra-team negotiation of compensation that the model
allows. For the sake of providing a clearer illustration, in the next section we present
a heuristic class of more stringent environments where the set of all stable systems
and their interrelations transpire more straightforwardly.
84 Single parameter imputation rules
We focus on environments in which countably infinite agents form teams whose
efficiency improves with their size without bound, i.e., M = N = ∞. We also
assume that P = 0. Hence, all efficient teams are of the same, infinite size, and all
such teams are efficient. This simplifies the set of teams potentially viable in stable
systems.
In addition, we postulate in this section that every team must adopt an impu-
tation rule represented by a single parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1), termed imputation ratio,
which is the ratio of the surplus share of any team member relative to that of the
member occupying the rank immediately above. That is, each team Z, including
a deviation, is required to choose a rank-imputation rule such that fr+1/fr is the
same for all r = 1, 2, · · · , |Z|− 1, which is the imputation ratio ρ. Note that a lower
ρ corresponds to greater internal inequality.
Then, denoting the rank of agent i in a team Z by ri(Z), the expected utility of
agent i in Z is
ui(Z, ρ) =
s(Z) · ρri(Z)−1
1 + ρ+ · · ·+ ρ|Z|−1 =
s(Z)(1− ρ)ρri(Z)−1
1− ρ|Z| (5)
= s(Z)(1− ρ)ρri(Z)−1 if |Z| =∞.
Thus, every agent should decide which team to join not only on the basis of the
team’s power, p(Z), but also on the basis of her expected rank in the team, ri(Z),
and the vertical inequality, ρ.
We now represent a system as (pi, ~ρ) consisting of a partition pi = {Z1, · · · , ZK}
of Ω into K teams, and a K-vector ~ρ = (ρ1, · · · , ρK) that specifies one imputation
ratio ρk ∈ (0, 1) for each team Zk ∈ pi. Such a system (pi, ~ρ) is stable under single-
parameter rule if there does not exist a deviation D ⊂ Ω whose members are better
off (some strictly) in the deviation under some imputation ratio.
Note that if a system (pi, ~ρ) is stable in the original sense (i.e., when deviations
may adopt any imputation rule), it is stable under single-parameter rule as well.
By Proposition 1, therefore, a system (pi, ~ρ) is stable under single-parameter rule
if every team is efficient and every agent’s payoff is equal to her ability. Below we
identify an intuitive class of systems that exhibit these properties, which also consist
of non-segregated rival teams; then, we verify that they are the only systems that
are stable under single-parameter rule.
A team Z is “K-cyclic” if it consists of every K-th agent starting from a certain
agent k, i.e., Z = {k, k + K, k + 2K, k + 3K, · · · }. Any such team is efficient as
p(Z) > 0 and |Z| = ∞. A “K-cyclic partition” is picK = {Z1, · · · , ZK} where each
Zk is K-cyclic starting from agent k for k = 1, 2, · · · , K.
A “symmetric K-cyclic system” (picK , ~ρ) where pi
c
K is the K-cyclic partition and
~ρ = (aK , · · · , aK), clearly delivers every agent a payoff that is equal to her ability
9and thus, constitutes a stable system. In fact, the same conclusion holds so long as
each team of a system is K-cyclic with an imputation ratio ρ = aK for some integer
K, where the value of K may vary across teams. We refer to such a system as a
“generalised cyclic” system. For example, in the symmetric 4-cyclic system, if Z1
and Z3 merge to form a 2-cyclic team and adopt an imputation ratio of a
2, then the
new system is a generalised cyclic system.
Having asserted that generalised cyclic systems are stable, we now establish that
a system is stable under single-parameter rule if and only if it is of this kind. There-
fore, organisations with varying norms of internal inequality may coexist. Moreover,
the more unequal internal norms a system displays across the board, the larger is
the number of rival organisations that have emerged in the system and the more
widely dispersed are the agents’ abilities within organisations.
Proposition 3 A system (pi, ~ρ) is stable under single-parameter rule if and only if
it is a generalised cyclic system.
Proof. It remains to show the “only if” part. To do this, we first show that agent i’s
payoff is ai−1 in any system (pi, ~ρ) that is stable (under single-parameter rule, which
we omit below for brevity). With a view to reaching a contradiction, suppose to the
contrary. Then, there exists an agent, say j1, whose payoff is strictly less than a
j1−1
in a stable system (pi, ~ρ). Find a sufficiently low ρ′ > 0 such that u′ = (1− ρ′)aj1−1
exceeds her payoff in (pi, ~ρ). For each r = 2, 3, · · · , one can find an agent, say jr,
whose payoff in the system (pi, ~ρ) falls short of u′ · (ρ′)r−1, maintaining the feature
that jr < jr+1. This is because there exists an agent i, where i is arbitrarily large,
whose payoff is arbitrarily low in the system either because her rank is arbitrarily
low in an infinite team, or in the case that there is no team of an infinite size, because
she is in a team of arbitrarily small power. Then, the deviation D′ = {j1, j2, · · · }
with the imputation ratio ρ′ is profitable because agent jr would have a payoff of
(1 − ρ′)(∑∞n=1 ajn−1)(ρ′)r−1 > u′ · (ρ′)r−1. This proves that agent i is paid ai−1 in
any stable system (pi, ~ρ).
Thus, every team Zk in a stable system must pay its members their abilities. For
this to be the case, s(Zk) must be equal to the sum of its members abilities, which is
possible only if Zk is efficient by (1), i.e., when |Zk| =∞ in the current environment.
Moreover, to pay its members their abilities using an imputation ratio, Zk must be
K-cyclic for some K ∈ N. This completes the proof.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have demonstrated that when agents with heterogeneous abilities need to form
teams in order to produce surplus by performing a number of complementary tasks,
the forces of competition and selection lead to emergence of non-segregated rival
teams, and more of them if they exhibit higher levels of internal inequality.
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Although our theoretical framework and results are not directly usable for nor-
mative analysis, it seems appropriate to mention that our results on the relationship
between vertical inequality and number of competing organizations may also enter
policy or regulation debates. For example, in relation to the recent discussion about
the pros and cons of imposing less inequality in pay structures within certain kinds
of firms, our analysis points to a possible implication of such a restriction that has
not been noted, namely, that such a restriction could lead to greater concentration
in the industry.
One limitation of our model is that the value of a team does not depend on
the partition of the rest of the agents. While this limitation is not critical in some
applications and contexts (e.g., production economies where the market shares tend
to be proportional to rival firms’ power), it is more limiting, for example, in political
economy applications: in plurality rule elections it makes a big difference for a
coalition expecting 30% of the votes whether the remaining 70% is divided into 7
small parties of 10% each or two parties of 35% each. An extension of the model
in which the relative power of any coalition depends not only on the ability of its
members but also on some other relevant dimension is in our future research agenda.
It would also be useful to analyse in the future the realistic extension in which
abilities are more than one dimensional, for example, to study whether stable sys-
tems with more groups tend to have a different sorting of ability compositions rela-
tive to systems with less competition.
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